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One of the most interesting cases in this respect is Germany. Over the past decades the volume of Germany's system of intergovernmental transfers ('Länderfinanzausgleich, LFA') has increased substantially. In 1970, the total sum of horizontal and vertical redistributive transfer flows amounted to 0.3 % of GDP, it climbed to 0.4 % of GDP in 1990, and in 2000 it reached over 1.6 % of GDP in nominal terms. Obviously, this upsurge is driven to a large extent by German Unification and the inclusion of the relatively poor five new Länder and the city state of Berlin in the fiscal transfer system since 1995. Although the rise of total transfer volume may be subject to criticism by itself, economic scholars are mostly troubled with substantial inefficiencies of the transfer system, attributable to a far-reaching equalization of the state's financial positions and a sizable number of questionable regulations, favoring certain states at the expense of others (Homburg 1994, Huber and Lichtblau 2000) . Some contributors discuss the political rationale behind interstate redistribution of fiscal revenues (Homburg 1997 , Lenk and Schneider 1999 , Blankart 2000 , Pitlik and Schmid 2000 . These papers suggest that political factors are at the heart of an explanation for the expansion and the direction of redistribution in the intergovernmental transfer system. This view is supported by a recent decision of Germany's Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2000) , in which previous regulations of the system of intergovernmental transfers were declared to be partly unconstitutional. What is exceptionally remarkable is that the judges advised political decision makers to frame new rules with the aim of limiting free bargaining among state and federal officials in negotiations for fiscal transfers. According to the Court's opinion the allocation of tax receipts and fiscal transfers among the states as well as between the states and the federal level has to be isolated from political forces in the bargaining process. 1 Thus, we take account of the special circumstances in Germany after 1991 which changed substantially the economic and political environment under which the transfer system thus far operated. Secondly, we also consider the effects of the bicameral system in Germany as well as covariates modeling partisan affiliations of federal and state governments in our empirical research. Thirdly, we test for an over time change in the factors shaping the distribution of net gains. We attempt to investigate whether more complex transfer negotiations due to an increasing number of players had an impact on the relative importance of political influences as compared to economic considerations. Finally, from a methodological standpoint, instead of simple cross sectional regressions, we make use of the time series-cross section (Grossman 1994, p. 298) . In this view, a state's net gain in the interregional redistribution game is shaped by its ability to supply political support in exchange for tax and transfer receipts.
The structure of intergovernmental fiscal systems is typically decided on in a legislative bargaining process, based on a simple majority rule. As is well known from social choice theory, in each simple majority decision concerning distributional issues, serious cycling problems are prevalent (McKelvey 1976) . In a highly influential paper, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) however show that stability may be achieved in a sequential legislative bargaining game. In their framework, one out of a total of N legislators is chosen randomly to propose a division of a fixed amount of money among the legislators. Each legislator represents one electoral district. After a proposal is made, the legislature is voting on it. If the proposer's offer is not accepted by a majority, the game goes on and a new proposer is selected randomly until a proposal is finally accepted.
Building a minimum winning coalition for his proposal, a self-interested proposer makes an offer to a majority of agents that keeps these legislators indifferent between accepting and continuing the game. In order to maximize his own share, it is therefore sensible for the proposer to form a coalition that is composed of legislators whose votes are cheapest to get. Lenk and Schneider (1999), for example, develop a revised transfers system, intended to reduce negative incentive effects. In contrast to many other proposals, mostly ignoring the political feasibility of a change, the argument Lenk and Schneider (1999) work out in favor of their proposal is that it alters financial flows in a direction which is supposed to achieve a majority of the involved states because it improves financial capacities.
elements of equalization rules primarily based on economic conditions and on a number of unspecified formulas. The East German states, including Berlin, benefited more than twice the national average from fiscal transfers per capita. In the group of Western states, Bremen received exceptionally high transfers, amounting to over three times the average, followed by Saarland (1.9 times the national per capita average). The remaining Western states gained below per capita average. 4 Lower tax revenues of the new Länder result both from a general economic weakness as well as a number of tax expenditures especially designed after German Unification to foster investment in East Germany. Due to an ever-increasing importance of more discretionary special grants on the third stage of the transfer system, we conjecture that the effects of overrepresentation might be more visible in later time periods (Hypothesis 3).
As the short depiction of the evolution of the German system of intergovernmental fiscal These simple tests, however, neglect a number of potentially influential factors for the determination of fiscal benefits. Hence, the descriptive analysis will be corroborated by a more refined and systematic multivariate analysis in the next section.
Multivariate analysis
In the following empirical tests we make use of the panel structure of the data, employing 
Before presenting the variables included in and before discussing the estimation results some remarks with respect to the estimation strategy are given. The first decision to be made is whether the individual effects are treated as "random" or "fixed". From a theoretical point of view there exist arguments in favor of both assumptions. As our data comprises the population of all German states and is not a sample this might argue for using a fixed effect model. Alike, a simple Hausman test also prefers the estimation of a fixed effect model.
However, as some of our main control variables -e.g. the dummy for a city state and the dummy for the new Länder -are time-constant we cannot control for their impact in a fixed effect framework. We therefore estimated both models with random and fixed effects to account for the sensitivity of the results. Since the results were rather stable we restrict the further presentation to the estimates of FGLS random effect models. 9 As different tests for serial correlation indicate the existence of first-order autocorrelation we additionally account for autocorrelation within panels or panel-specific first-order autocorrelation. Furthermore, we allow for heteroscedasticity across panels (see e.g. Model (2) includes two further covariates. CITY is an indicator for the three city states (Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin). All city-states are overrepresented in the upper house, though Berlin only moderately. There may be a reason to give higher transfers to city states due to spillover effects into the surrounding states. However, Homburg (1997) has shown that the Länderfinanzausgleich is not an adequate instrument to correct spillovers. Nevertheless, we control for city states even if the economic justification for higher transfers to these states is weak at best. We expect a positive sign of the coefficient. NEWSTATE is a dummy variable for the five new Länder and Berlin to correct for the unquestionable higher financial needs of these states. The sign of NEWSTATE is expected to be positive.
In the basic regressions (1) and (2) all coefficients behave in the predicted manner. RELTAX is highly significant and negative, showing that higher initial tax revenues lead to lower benefits in the intergovernmental transfer system. BRREP and BTREP both show a positive sign, indicating that overrepresented states receive higher benefits. The coefficient of the In 1994, the central government started to donate special supplementary grants to the heavily indebted states Bremen and Saarland. So far, in our analyses we excluded this period from our estimations as this year is a heavy outlier with respect to the dependent variable. Though the inclusion of the year 1994 does not severely change the general results additional insights can be gained by omitting special grants to Bremen and Saarland, intended to mitigate budgetary problems of both states (Sanierungs-BEZ), out of the calculation of RELGAIN (see Model (6)). The results show that the impact of BRREP would have dropped down to levels even less than the corresponding levels in the period from 1970 to 1986 if special favors were not 11 Our coding of a state depends on the timing of the last elections. If elections were held in the first 6 months, the state government is coded according to the result of the respective year's election. Otherwise, a change in the government coalition only becomes relevant for the next year. 12 We also tested for differences in the coefficients in the (rare) cases when a federal government is not dependent on B-or C-states. However, we found no dissimilarity. Germany's upper chamber (Pitlik 2004 ). An almost four year lag of reform implementation appears to be far too short to create a sufficient degree of distributional uncertainty.
One might also argue that any serious reform should deal with malapportionment in the upper chamber, which it is at the heart of the considered problems. Yet, disproportionality of representation is rooted in constitutional rules or electoral laws that are sticky over time. 
